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The pipeline productivity challenge facing large, publicly traded pharmaceutical companies,
collectively referred to as "Big Pharma," is well known. The unprecedented success Big Pharma
achieved over the past few decades in commercializing blockbuster products means that it is
now faced with near-term patent expirations on such products, representing billions of dollars in
lost sales and profits. In order to maintain its economic momentum, Big Pharma is increasingly
relying on the universe of smaller, early stage biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies as
a source of new products.
Early stage companies may offer Big Pharma something beyond simply more product bets.
Several recent consulting studies have shown that economic returns to Big Pharma of products
sourced externally are greater than those developed internally, which raises the question: What,
if anything, are early stage companies doing differently from Big Pharma in their product
development programs?
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate product development programs ("projects") and compare
qualitatively and quantitatively the decisions for projects at key decision points between early
stage pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and Big Pharma. Given that much of the
critical discovery and R&D work on pharmaceutical products happens both before and during a
product's entry into human clinical trials, this thesis focuses on those areas of the development
continuum where R&D plays a central role. The key decision points are therefore: lead
candidate selection/optimization, moving a project from pre-clinical trials into Phase I human
clinical trials, and moving a project from Phase I to Phase II clinical trials in humans.
The thesis tests the hypothesis that small, early stage, publicly traded U.S. & Canadian biotech
and pharma firms (Small Pharma) focused on 1-2 therapeutic areas who high levels of
homogeneity in their decision making process, number of decision inputs, prioritization
processes, and metrics for all three key decision points in the product development process
irrespective of whether a product originates inside or outside the company. In comparison, Big
Pharma companies will show heterogeneity in these variables for their projects. I have obtained
data from primary interviews of industry executives within Big Pharma and Small Pharma firms.
The therapeutic areas selected for the early stage company data set are: (1) cancer and
autoimmune disease, (2) cardiovascular disease, and (3) infectious disease. The rationale for
these therapeutic areas is that there is significant drug development activity taking place in
these fields, and there are significant unmet medical needs within them. Additionally, both Big
Pharma and Small Pharma companies are developing products in these fields. I compare these
data sets statistically using Fisher's exact test and Yates' chi-square test.
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Chapter I: Introduction
In recent years, pharmaceutical industry research and development (R&D) productivity has
been assessed, discussed, and debated intensively. Faced with patent expirations from 2006-
2013 on products that will have generated sales of over $100 billion in the U.S. alone during that
time,' 6 the pharmaceutical industry's leading companies must confront a double challenge: to
replace sales and profits lost as the result of product patent expirations, and to grow profits for
shareholders. Ostensibly, the most straightforward way for them to address both challenges is
to continue to do what they have done historically: commercialize new products that offer
improved therapeutic outcomes to patients versus existing therapies. However, the magnitude
of the task is unprecedented within the industry, and it begs the question: can an industry
maintain such a spectacularly successful run of innovation and productivity?
For the past few decades, large pharmaceutical companies ("Big Pharma;" see Exhibit 1 for
definition) have licensed and acquired products from outside sources such as smaller, early-
stage pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms (as well as universities) to augment product
pipelines and enhance prospects for sales and profit growth. While the degree to which
companies historically engaged in this activity has varied, virtually all now make it a strategic
imperative. Merck exemplifies this trend. In 1999 the company did only 10 licensing deals,
whereas it signed 50 in 2004.7 Going back further, Danzon et al found that the top 20
pharmaceutical firms did an average of 1.4 licensing deals per year with a biotechnology
company from 1988-1990, but 5.7 such deals from 1997-1998." PricewaterhouseCoopers found
in a 1998 report that the number of alliances per year had more than doubled in the industry
from 1989 to 1998, from 248 to 635 per year.9 Certainly the number of deals does not take into
account important parameters such as the potential value of a given deal. However, given the
relatively low odds of success of any single early-stage drug development project, the number
of deals has a probabilistic impact on success, and is therefore a metric that is often tracked by
industry analysts.
The Benefits of Looking Outside
Recent studies suggest that Big Pharma benefits economically from looking beyond its own
walls for new products."1 Studies by McKinsey & Company and Mercer Management
Consulting from 2004 and 2003, respectively, have found that products in-licensed by top ten
Big Pharma companies have higher rates of success in obtaining marketing approval than
internally developed products, and furthermore, in-licensed products generate higher rates of
return. 10' 1 DiMasi showed that by the end of 1999, the percentage of investigational new drug
applications (INDs) of externally acquired new chemical entity (NCE) products filed from 1981 to
1992 that had been approved by the FDA was 33.1%, as compared to 16.9% for all internally
developed products. 12 Key findings from the DiMasi study are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Clinical Approval Success Rates for NCEs by Origin and Period During Which a
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Selected Recent Studies on R&D Productivity and Licensing Activity in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
Figure 2 below summarizes selected recent studies on pharmaceutical R&D productivity as well
as success rates of externally sourced pharmaceutical products compared to those that were
internally developed. Several key themes from these studies include:
* Product licensed by Big Pharma from the outside have higher success rates of approval
and higher rates of return on investment compared to internally developed products.
* Licensing deals and strategic alliances between Big Pharmas and Small Pharmas have
increased dramatically within the last twenty years.
* Pharmaceutical companies stand to gain economically by licensing programs from other














* Regulatory and economic incentives appear to motivate for the expanded development
of existing chemical entities (i.e., pursuing approvals of new indications for an already
approved drug) in favor of developing new chemical entities (NCEs)
* Increasing organizational bureaucracy and unprecedented Big Pharma firm size appear
to adversely impact pharmaceutical R&D success.
These findings have important implications for the ways in which the pharmaceutical industry
might manage its R&D efforts to enhance its prospects for success going forward.
Licensing from smaller firms is not the only way in which Big Pharma can augment its pipeline;
buying smaller firms outright via mergers & acquisitions is another. Ernst & Young estimates
that the top 40 pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies spent $16 billion in 2006 acquiring
20 specialty pharma and biotech companies.13 While such investment is hardly in the same
economic league as the mega-mergers of Pfizer and Warner-Lambert or Glaxo Wellcome and
SmithKline Beecham, both in the year 2000, it is notable in that many of these deals are for
companies with early stage technologies that will require substantial further investment to
commercialize the assets acquired. Mega-mergers historically gave the newly merged
companies "breathing room" to grow sales and earnings through organizational synergies that
often had little to do with new product development. Commonly, such synergies in Big Pharma
mergers have been derived more from cost-cutting measures in administrative and sales force
organizations and less from R&D productivity, though rationalizations of R&D pipelines - for the
benefit of cost savings - have certainly been pursued.
Figure 2. Selected Recent Studies on R&D Productivity and Licensing Activity in the Pharmaceutical Industry and
Findings.8,9,14-25
Study/Year Sample Time Frame Drug Types Variables Evaluated Findings
U.S. Congressional Budget Various Various Both new chemical Various In 2002 the largest 10 pharmaceutical firms accounted
Office (CBO): Research & entities (NCEs) and Effect of Mergers for 48% of pharmaceutical sales worldwide, up from
Development in the new indications for 20% in 1985
Pharmaceutical Industry / existing drugs Both
2006 new chemical As of date of report, 8 of 10 the top pharma
entities (NCEs) and companies were the products of mergers between two
new indications for or more drug companies
existing drugs
R&D expenditures of merged companies grew slower
than those of non-merged companies, though their
rate did not change from those of the merging
companies; thus, mergers may initially divert
resources away from R&D.
U.S. Government 1,264 new drug 1993-2004 Both NCEs and NCEs versus new 68% of NDAs submitted during the period were for
Accountability Office (GAO) applications (NDAs) new indications for indications for existing non-new chemical entities (NCEs) (e.g., new
/2006 existing drugs drugs indications for existing drugs)
Georgia State University & 180 transactions in 1994-2001 Both NCEs and Motivations for merging or Deterioration of internal R&D pipeline correlates with
Emory University: "The 15 countries new indications for acquiring likelihood of acquiring another company; firms
outsourcing of R&D through existing drugs experiencing the greatest deterioration in R&D
acquisitions in the pipelines were found to be most likely to pursue an
pharmaceutical industry" / acquisition of a research intensive firm
2005
Degree of success in 71% of acquirers were found to improve or maintain
leveraging R&D from their product pipelines or portfolios post-acquisition;
acquisition abnormally high stock market returns for post-
announcement period was found to be +3.91%
Degree of access to (1) Alliances with target firm prior to acquisition; (2)
information in pre- alliances with other firms in same therapeutic category
acquisition period on the as target firm; and (3) internal research and prior
part of the acquirer prior to sales within same therapeutic category as target firm
doing the acquisition all correlate with higher acquirer returns
Can acquirers avoid over- Yes. Through information gathering (see above),
paying (as evidenced by acquirers realize higher returns than firms who do not
stock market returns post engage in information gathering activities.
acquisition)?
Study/Year Sample Time Frame Drug Types Variables Evaluated Findings
Boston Consulting Group / -Top 10 Various Both NCEs and - Dollar productivity From 1991-2001, most revenue growth for top2004 pharmaceutical depending on new indications for biotechnology & pharmaceutical companies came
companies parameter: existing drugs from an increase in the number of blockbusters
-Top 10 biotech 1980s, 1990s,
companies 2004 The number of blockbusters is approaching
- All but top 10 "equilibrium" - i.e., the number of blockbusters going
biotech companies off patent will soon equal or exceed the number of
new blockbusters being launched in a given year
Increasing complexity in terms of larger organization
and size of R&D budget may bring economies of scale
but also results in less organizational knowledge
about each project
Scale disadvantages larger firms relative to the
"intimate... dialogue and partnering enjoyed by
academia and small biotechs," and thus impedes
progress in highly insight-driven elements of the value
chain, such as medicinal chemistry or protocol design
- Capitalization Small biotechnology companies were found to have
- Products in Pipeline less than 10% of the biopharmaceutical industry's
cash yet 67% of the industry's pipeline in 2003
External sources (i.e., licensing partnerships) are cited
as one of the key "remedies" to the biopharmaceutical
industry's R&D product pipeline challenges.
Boston Consulting Group: 2500 compounds Point in time: Both NCEs and Status: licensed or not 1,000 of the available compounds were licensed at
"The Gentle Art of ("Worldwide Clinical 2004 new indications for time of studyLicensing" / 2004 Pipeline") within existing drugs Both
small NCEs and new Compounds were being licensed at rate of 10% perbiopharmaceutical indications for year
companies existing drugs
Supply (e.g., new compounds available) were growing
at 2% per year
Only 30% of remaining compounds would be
"suitable" for licensing
Thus, a shortage in available compounds for licensing
was predicted.
Study/Year Sample Time Frame Drug Types Variables Evaluated Findings
McKinsey & Company / - Top 10 1995-2001 Both NCEs and Cost of development Pre-clinical development costs range from $21 to $292004 pharmaceutical new indications for million for internally developed compounds versus $14
companies' existing drugs - $19 million those that are in-licensed
preclinical




1997- 2001 Both NCEs and Average cumulative four year Virtually no difference in average cumulative revenues
- 71 internal and 73 new indications for revenues was found for first four years of commercialization
in-licensed existing drugs between internal and externally sourced compounds.
compounds Success in progressing to
1998-2000 Both NCEs and commercialization Licensed compounds were successful in 27% of
- 1,448 compounds new indications for cases (Phases 1-3) while internal candidates were
existing drugs successful only 14% in these stages.
McKinsey & Company Top 10 Pharma & 1997 -2002 Both NCEs and Compounds in Development Total number of compounds in development in allTrends in R&D Productivity Other Companies new indications for phases grew from 5,015 in 1997 to 5,604 in 2002;
and Implications for Japan / existing drugs during that time, Top 10 Pharma's share of these2004 programs declined as a percentage of total from 25%
to 15% and also declined in total number
R&D Costs 1991-2001 Compounds in development R&D costs for Top 10 pharma companies and other
companies were $7B and $5B, respectively in 1991
and $12B and $19B in 2001; CAGRs for R&D were
6% and 14% respectively during the time period, with
development costs far exceeding research costs.
Japanese firms were found to be producing more than
twice (2x) as many compounds per dollar of R&D
spend; however, they were not as successful as
global leaders in terms of commercial sales or in
return on R&D spend; partnerships and alliances were
cited as two ways for Japanese companies to close
the gap.
Long Island University / Two mergers in 1981-1989 NCEs only Cost per NME of merged First wave: Cost per NME in constant dollarsKoenig & Mezick / 1989 ("first wave"); 1994-1996 versus non-merged increased by 65% compared to an increase of 101%2004 Five mergers from 1990-2000 companies for non-merged companies
1994-1996 ("second
wave"); Second wave: Cost per NME in constant dollars
Eight comparator increased by 17% compared to an increase of 93% for
non-merged non-merged companies
companies
Study/Year Sample Time Frame Drug Types Variables Measured Findings
Danzon, Nicholson, Pereira 900 firms 1988-2000 Both NCEs and Phase-specific success rates Firm experience and experience within therapeutic
/2003 new indications for based on category do not matter for Phase I but do correlate
existing drugs Overall firm experience with success beyond Phase I
Firm experience within
therapeutic category Development alliances occurs for majority of
Diversification of firm compounds by Phase 2 or 3
experience
Firm alliances with large and Products developed in alliances have higher
small firms probability of success in Phase 2 and 3, especially
if licensor is a large firm (a firm with > 25
_compounds in development).
Mercer Management 68 compounds 1995-1999 Both NCEs and Success in clinical In-licensed products had higher rates of clinicalConsulting / across 10 leading new indications for development development success at all stages (47%, 14%, and
2003 pharmaceutical existing drugs 38% at pre-clinical, Phase 1-2, and Phase 3,
companies respectively)
Approved in-licensed compounds attained relatively
lower (76%) sales than internally sourced
compounds
Internal rates of return on in-licensed compounds
were higher than internally developed ones (3.1%
at Pre-clinical, 4.0% at Phase 1-2, and 8.2% at
Phase 3, compared to 2.1% for all internally
developed compounds). IRR of in-licensed
compounds improved with stage of licensing.
DiMasi, Hansen & 68 NCEs randomly 2000 NCEs Capitalized out of pocket Capitalized out of pocket costs for an NCE to theGrabowski / selected from 10 costs of an NCE to point of point of marketing approval = $802MM in 2000
2003 pharmaceutical marketing approval dollars.
firms
McKinsey & Company / Top 12 pharma 1991-2002 Both NCEs and Simulated Monte Carlo Pharma companies could dramatically increase the
2002 company licensing new indications for analysis based on industry amounts paid for licenses in early development
deals with existing drugs Both averages to determine: (150% more in most cases at the pre-clinical stage)
biotechnology firms NCEs and new - optimal time of licensing
from 1991 - 2002 indications for - value realization by firm A pharma company reaped maximum value in 85%
existing drugs type by phase of of cases by licensing (where a license deal could
development. be negotiated) at the pre-clinical phase
Pharma companies capture greatest expected
value from pre-clinical licensing virtually 100% of
the time because greater risk of failure was more
than offset by low deal terms at this early
development stage; biotech firms reap maximum
value in Phase 2 or 3
If deal terms were economically more attractive to
biotech firms, licensing at earlier stages could
become more attractive due to incremental upside.
Study/Year Sample Time Frame Drug Types Variables Evaluated Findings
DiMasi / 671 NCEs 1981-1992 NCEs only Time from investigational new Out of 508 Self-originated NCEs and 163 acquiredClinical Pharmacology & drug (IND) filing to NCEs, by end of 1999:
Therapeutics / abandonment or approval
2001 20.9% of NCEs with INDs filed from 1981 to 1992
had been approved for US marketing
Success rates for types of NCEs were as follows:
NCES that were acquired: 33.1%
NCEs that were self-originated: 16.9%
NCEs that were self-originated and first tested in
humans in the US: 8.6%.
Mean residence time (time to either approval or
research abandonment) declined from the 1981-
1983 interval to the 1990-1992 interval by 30% (1.5
years).
Median survival time decreased 12% from 4.9
years to 4.3 years for the 1981-1983 to 1990-1992
filing intervals, respectively.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers: Various 1996-1998 Both new chemical R&D spending of U.S. U.S. pharmaceutical and biotech companies spent
"Pharma 2005" / entities (NCEs) and pharmaceutical and biotech $6.5B on R&D in 1988 and an estimated $21.1
1998 new indications for companies billion in 1998
existing drugs
Number of pre-clinical From 1996-1998, the number of compounds in pre-
candidates in the clinical testing were as follows:
pharmaceutical industry 1996: 2,853
pipeline 1997: 3,102
1998: 3,278
Qualitative observations "... many research scientists tell us that they do not
about process of research find working in large organizations conducive to
originality, lateral thinking, and innovation."
Number of strategic alliances From 1988 to 1998, the number of strategic
in the pharmaceutical alliances more than doubled from 248 to 635 per
industry year.
Objective of Thesis
The preponderance of evidence suggests that projects selected by Big Pharma for in-licensing
are more successful than those that are developed within the firm. Such evidence raises an
important question: what is it about these extemally initiated projects that renders them more
successful? On the surface, if Big Pharma firms were rational, we would expect that on the
margin internal and external projects would be equally successful. There are several possible
explanations for the differences observed. First, it may be that Big Pharma gives more attention
to in-licensed products and they must therefore meet a higher standard for incorporation into the
portfolio. The corollary to this idea is that internal projects are more difficult to "kill" or terminate.
Secondly, external projects produced by smaller firms may indeed be of higher quality,
supported by more thorough evidence or evaluated on different (more objective) criteria. IN
order to examine this question, this thesis explores differences in decision-making processes in
two different organizational settings: Big Pharma and Small Pharma.
The specific objective of this thesis is to evaluate whether there is a difference in the ways in
which Big Pharma companies and smaller pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies make
decisions around and prioritize drug development projects on the basis of whether a project was
sourced internally or externally (see Exhibits 1 and 2 for definitions of "Big Pharma" and "Small
Pharma," respectively. Specifically, I seek to evaluate selected decision points at both Big
Pharma and Small Pharma companies to see if there are discernible differences - either
quantitatively or qualitatively - in how which each approaches the drug development process
based on the origination of the project (internal or external). Given the results of numerous
studies over the past few years, one would hypothesize that there is something different about
the way in which the two types of firms manage drug development based on whether a project
originates externally or intemally.
The Pharmaceutical Industry's R&D Productivity Challenge
In purely economic terms, the pharmaceutical industry, like any other, is challenged to exceed
its past performance in the form of earnings growth. Thus, the industry is tasked by investors
and shareholders with the challenge of becoming more productive over time. From an investor
perspective, gauging the productivity of a business is fairly straightforward. Return on
investment (ROI) should increase over time. Other metrics, such as return on capital employed
(ROCE) and return on equity (ROE), also help gauge economic productivity. In the
pharmaceutical industry, though, where a drug typically takes twelve years or more to be
developed, capital can be employed for extended periods of time before generating a return,
thus adding to the complexity of assessing industry performance. Nonetheless, the economic
metrics of the pharmaceutical industry are perhaps the easiest to assess when one can
consider a long period of time historically, such as ten years or more. However, in trying to
evaluate shorter-term industry performance and productivity through various other metrics, the
challenge becomes far greater.
The Challenge of Assessing Pharmaceutical R&D Metrics: NMEs and "Drug
Quality"
Numerous metrics have been used to assess the productivity of R&D spending within the
pharmaceutical industry. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) tracks annual R&D spending as well as FDA approvals of new medical entities
(NMEs) of its member companies, and while PhRMA member firms' R&D spending constitutes
only a portion of that for the industry as a whole, it is often used in literature as a barometer for
the industry. Sales and total number of new products launched, two other closely monitored
metrics, are often measured against R&D spending in a given year. However, it has been noted
that in attempting to assess pharmaceutical R&D productivity, one needs to look ahead in future
years to determine the impact of R&D spending in a given year, since the results of such R&D
expenditures in terms of products approved, sales, and profits are realized in the future on a
rolling basis (i.e., they do not all accrue in one year).
The use of NMEs as a metric of R&D productivity has its challenges and can be misleading.
Berndt et al have pointed out that innovation within the pharmaceutical industry can take
different forms, such as expanded indications for existing drugs that are supported by new
clinical studies, new dosage forms, and new formulations.26 Such expanded efforts for existing
products require significant investment in R&D and often have highly positive economic returns.
Nonetheless, industry observers and participants alike, including the FDA and other government
entities, continue to assess pharmaceutical R&D spending and NME approvals as two important
industry metrics. In utilizing data from the U.S. Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers
Association (PhRMA), such metrics generally yield a picture of escalating R&D spend with a
concurrent declining trend in the number of NMEs approved since the 1998-1999 time frame, as
illustrated by Figure 3.
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Source: Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). Years 1996-2006 include both FDA Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) reviewed products as well as those transferred into CDER from the Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).
Figure 4 represents another look at the situation. Booth and Zemmel looked at NME output per
R&D dollar in 2004.27 As can be seen, NME output per dollar, normalized to 1970-1975 average
dollar values, has declined on a prolonged basis.
Figure 4. The Decline in NME Output per R&D Dollar, 1974-2002.
Sources: PhRMA, Parexel Pharmaceutical R&D Statistical Sourcebook, McKinsey & Company.
The rationale for using NME output as a metric to evaluate the industry is that an NME is
essentially by definition a newly-patented product and is therefore the purest form of product
innovation. While companies can extend market exclusivity on existing products by developing
new indications (in the U.S., for example, three-year extended exclusivity is permitted through
new use/new clinical studies by an applicant for new indications for an already approved drug),
doing so does not provide the same period of market exclusivity that might be realized by a
newly issued patent on an approved NME.
However, as a 2006 U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report observes, the metric of
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impact upon productivity. 14 Unfortunately, defining and measuring quality can be difficult. Few
studies have attempted to define drug quality, and it remains a debated term.
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Sources: CDER, CMR, Ernst & Young, Goldman Sachs, Pharmaceutical Product Development (PPDI).
When taking into account not only NMEs but also new drug applications (NDAs) on a global
level, the picture is similar in terms of flat to declining numbers of NDAs and NMEs in the
pipeline compared to growing R&D spending both within pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies (Note: please refer to Chapter . Figure 5 shows industry output compared to R&D
expenditure from 1993-2004. A look at the trend lines shows that global R&D spending has
increased at the rate of 7.9% per year since 1993, whereas the number of INDs filed has grown
at 1.1% per year since that time. These figures, as well as their trend lines, are plotted against
each other in Figure 6 below.
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Sources: CDER, CMR, Ernst & Yong, Goldman Sachs, Pharmaceutical Product Development (PPDI).
Costs of Drug Development
On a pure cost basis, costs of drug development per NDA have risen steadily over time. Cost
estimates for developing an NDA drug candidate range from $802 million23 from DiMasi et al to
a Bain & Company estimate of $1.7 billion.28 While in the past, increases in R&D costs could be
absorbed due to top line sales growth in Big Pharma firms, the question of whether such
expenditures can be sustained in the wake of declining sales and fewer NDA/BLA filings per
R&D dollar becomes relevant due to future patent expirations on large-selling Big Pharma
products. We will look at this question in more detail later.
'"
The Perception of an Industry R&D Productivity Decline
While various metrics pose challenges in assessing whether there is a productivity decline in
pharmaceutical R&D, a cursory view of industry and academic literature reveals a broadly held
perception that a productivity gap exists. Indeed, the CBO 2006 report states that:
"In the absence of comprehensive, statistical measures, the drug industry's performance can be
considered qualitatively. Even if drug quality has been increasing, the industry's performance
may still have declined, for several reasons."14
The CBO report cites several factors that suggest pharmaceutical R&D productivity has
declined, such as a decline in number of drugs approved per dollar of R&D and a growing share
of industry R&D investment expended on "incremental" improvements to drugs.14 The report
cites several possible causes for a decline in pharmaceutical industry R&D productivity. They
include: the ebb and flow of scientific innovations and discoveries (as opposed to linear
progression); increasing technological complexity; rising real wages without an accompanying
increase in R&D output; and increased current R&D spending as investment in higher future
productivity.14 To these factors, we can add several proposed by Cuatrecasas, such as: the
sheer mass and complexity of today's large pharmaceutical organizations (e.g., Big Pharma)
which perpetuate bureaucracy and discourage innovation; the lack of understanding among Big
Pharma management, Wall Street, and investors regarding the drug development process and
timeline; and the decline of the role of the "champion" in drug development.29 We explore these
factors and how they may be impacting pharmaceutical R&D in the next section.
The Pharmaceutical R&D Environment
Significant debate has ensued recently as to whether the "blockbuster" model of Big Pharma,
that of commercializing products that realize a billion dollars (often multiple billions of dollars) in
sales, is viable or sustainable.30 Rather than targeting cost saving synergies from blockbuster
selling organizations, the smaller acquisitions described above have focused more on specific
types of technology and expertise than on cost savings synergies. While creating big-selling,
blockbuster products will likely always be a consideration in Big Pharma's strategic approach to
drug development, a number of questions arise as to the ways in which it might seek to produce
new products going forward - blockbuster or not. How should Big Pharma develop new
products? What strategies should it employ to produce products that can enjoy longer life
cycles? How can licensing products from the outside augment the process? An examination of
the pharmaceutical R&D environment in general may explain some of the strategies by which
both Big Pharma and Small Pharma are approaching the development of next-generation
therapies and why they are evolving. Factors that may impede productivity could be driving
changes in the way the pharmaceutical industry performs R&D as it attempts to become more
efficient.
How Did We Get Here? A Look at the Changing Dynamics of Pharma R&D
To gain some appreciation for the pharmaceutical R&D environment as it exists today, it is
worth elaborating upon the factors cited above as possible contributors to a decline in
pharmaceutical R&D productivity. There are no doubt other potential factors to be explored,
although Cuatrecasas notes that some of these, such as inadequate staffing and budgetary
allocation of regulatory bodies such as the FDA, are merely symptomatic of more fundamental
challenges relating to factors such as pharmaceutical company corporate culture, understanding
of science, management, and organizational structure, to name a few.29 Certain key trends
within the industry, such as the explosive growth of partnerships, as well as unprecedented
levels of venture capital going into the life sciences, are being driven by, and in response to,
these factors. (Note: $2.58 billion of venture capital was invested in U.S. based biotechnology
and medical device start-up companies in the first quarter of 2007, all time highs for both
categories.31 In this context, the term "biotechnology" is all encompassing for companies
focused on any type of drug development research, including that of traditional
pharmaceuticals).
The Ebb and Flow of Scientific Discoveries. With respect to ebb and flow of scientific
discoveries, a new scientific finding may lead to a series of quick, new innovations - the "easy"
discoveries. 16 Following these, the next discoveries or innovations may be much harder to
achieve, require greater R&D expense, and could actually result in lower retums. In essence,
the process of discovery is not straightforward or linear. I propose that the dynamic of the ebb
and flow of scientific drug discovery, inclusive of both the "easy" and "harder" discoveries, hasn't
really changed over time; rather, the expectations of investors and the commitments of
management teams of publicly traded Big Pharmas have ratcheted up in recent years, to the
point that they have surpassed what is possible in terms of discovery output and capabilities.
Drug discovery has always been a costly, highly risky process. As Figure 7 illustrates, historic
experience within the industry has shown that 10,000 compounds must be assessed at the
discovery stage, the earliest stage of drug development, for every one drug that is approved.
Moreover, the time line for commercializing a drug can often run from 10-14 years in length.
Figure 7. The Drug Development "Funnel" of Candidates Tested by Phase,
Timing, and Costs.
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Increasing Technological Complexity. There is little doubt that technological complexity
within drug discovery and development is increasing dramatically. While on the one hand the
mapping of the human genome has brought about new scientific tools, such as DNA
microarrays and other technologies that theoretically should enhance our understanding of life
and disease, it has not translated into an anticipated plethora of new drug filings. 32 Complexity
creates enormous challenges in a genomic era of drug discovery in that the vast majority of
biological functions occur through the interaction of multiple genes. Furthermore, most biological
interactions are non-linear. So, while we have more data than ever before, at the genomic,
proteomic, and imaging levels (both systems and anatomical), we are actually now "awash" in
it.33 Figure 8 illustrates the complex feedback loop that exists in drug development programs
which requires mastery in the genomic era. Figure 9 illustrates the various levels of organism for









Figure 8. Selected Knowledge Driven Components of Drug Development
in the Genomic Age.33
Figure 9. Levels of Organism in Which Knowledge Must be Integrated
in the Genomic Age.33
Pisano points out that the theoretical promise that biotechnology would revolutionize
pharmaceutical R&D productivity has not occurred. Indeed, echoing the point made above
about data, he argues that biotechnology has actually increased the uncertainties in
pharmaceutical R&D. 34 Considering the complexity illustrated in Figures 8 and 9 above, one can
appreciate how it has proliferated in the genomic age.
Rising R&D Costs. The U.S. CBO report cites the possibility of rising real R&D wages without
an accompanying increase in R&D output as a possible contributor to a productivity gap.
However, it appears that a greater potential contributor to pharmaceutical R&D labor costs may
be the growth in R&D staffing within the industry. In the U.S., the number of R&D scientists and
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engineers in the pharmaceutical industry grew from an estimated 34,300 in 1990 to roughly
50,000 in 1999, an increase of 45.8%.35 On an annualized basis, then, staffing levels of R&D
scientists and engineers in the U.S. grew over 3.8% per year. If this growing labor pool has
realized real wage growth for the past twenty years, which it has, then there is a compounding
effect on R&D labor expense based on the expansion of the labor pool.
However, Big Pharma company sales and profits increased steadily over that time period, and
thus have grown despite increases in R&D scientist headcount and wages and other increasing
costs, such as selling, general, and administrative expenses. PhRMA member R&D spending
as a percentage of sales nearly doubled from 9.3% in 1970 to 17.5% in 2006.36 R&D expense
for PhRMA members has grown at 12.5% per year from 1970 to 2006, whereas member firm
sales growth has increased at 10.6% per year since 1970. So while overall R&D expenses have
risen faster than sales, they have not risen so rapidly as to cause profits to decline.
DiMasi et al evaluated growth in industry R&D employment costs and reached similar
conclusions.23 They found a 7.4% annual growth rate in total R&D employment from 1980 to
2000. They found a 1.75% increase in real wages for full-time employed biological scientists
from 1993 to 1999 using median annual salary data from the National Science Foundation
(NSF) and adjusting for inflation (using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator). Salary data for every
two years from the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) showed similar growth in real
wages; from 1981 to 1989 for biological scientists with doctorates employed business or
industry was 1.77%. Thus, DiMasi et al applied the average of the two real wage growth figures,
1.76%, across the 7.4% total R&D employment growth, the result of which is a 9.3% annual
increase in R&D labor costs for the period 1980 to 2000.23 They conclude, as I have, that most
of the growth in labor costs has come from labor force expansion within R&D as opposed to real
wage increases. PhRMA member firm sales varied greatly over the time period but grew at a
rate exceeding 9.3% annually in eleven years and less than 9.3% annually for nine years (See
Figure 10).
Figure 10. Growth Rates in Top Line Sales of PhRMA Member Firms, 1981-2006, Plotted
against 9.3% Annualized Growth Rate in R&D Labor Costs, 1981-2000.
Sources: PhRMA Industry Profile 2007, DiMasi et al.23
Rising Clinical Costs. Clinical costs certainly warrant assessment as a driver of
pharmaceutical R&D costs, since, at 28% of global pharmaceutical R&D spending (Phases I, II,
and III), they represent the single biggest cost factor, as Figure 11 illustrates. While R&D labor
costs have contributed to the increasing costs of drug development, clinical trial costs have
been growing more rapidly. DiMasi et al found that for the period from 1984 to 1997, clinical trial
costs grew at a compound annual growth rate of 11.4%.23 Furthermore, DiMasi et al cite data
that indicate a 4.8% increase in complexity of clinical trials for Phases I through III from 1992 to
2000.23 (Complexity in this case is an index based on the mean number of medical procedures
to be conducted on patients per the protocol of the clinical trial.) This added complexity
translates directly into higher costs.
The costs of clinical trials have escalated over time for various reasons. Many of them pertain to
inclusion of larger populations in clinical studies. In the U.S., the FDA has pushed for larger
safety subject databases, a broader range of dosing studies during phase 3, more diverse
populations in phase 3, inclusion of comparative safety trials, and large simple safety studies
(LSSS) as an element of pre-market development.37 The number of patients required by the
FDA for clinical studies nearly doubled from 1995-2005.37 While there has been some question
as to whether longer regulatory approval times have contributed to higher clinical costs,
evidence from Booth and Zemmel and others does not appear to support this hypothesis.27
Figure 11. Breakdown of Global Pharmaceutical R&D Costs, 2006.
Sources: PhRMA; Pharmaceutical Product Development (PPDI), 2006.
Increased R&D Spending as an Investment in Higher Future Productivity. Investment is
made in R&D by businesses routinely when there is an anticipated opportunity for higher
productivity at a future point in time. As we have already seen, increasing technological
complexity and the advent of biotechnology have not demonstrably led to reduced R&D costs in
drug development. Certain technologies, such as high throughput screening and biomarkers,
offer the potential to reduce costs by enabling earlier stage, more precise identification of
desired targets, thus preventing expenditures of large sums of money downstream in clinical
development on candidates that may ultimately fail in clinical trials. Drug companies are buying
and using these technologies aggressively. However, they have yet to demonstrate benefit in
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In the case of biomarkers, which are in the early stages of development as a technology, they
are viewed currently as somewhat unreliable. The initial investment for a biomarker program is
substantial, and additional challenges with biomarker technology include: the lack of
standardized methods, equipment evaluation, appropriate sensitivity and specificity for selected
markers, and qualification of the markers themselves. It is clear that until the pharmaceutical
industry and its constituents overcome these obstacles, such technologies cannot provide
maximum value to the drug development process.
Unprecedented Big Pharma Firm Size. Big Pharma has never been bigger in terms of firm
sales. Indeed, many of the Big Pharma companies, Aventis, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Pfizer, and Wyeth, are the products of mega-mergers. For a time
period, it is certainly possible to wring profits out of combining organizations. Eliminating
duplicative functions or organizations, rationalizing drug development portfolios, and
consolidating manufacturing operations are a few of the ways in which merging companies seek
to reduce operating costs of a newly merged entity. While the costs savings can climb into the
billions of dollars per year, the downside of large mergers is that the new, larger company must
find even more products and generate even more sales to deliver long-term profit growth to
investors.
The blockbuster model, commercializing products with sales in excess of $1 billion annually,
has become necessary for such enormous firms to sustain sales and profit growth and satisfy
investors. Thus, products with smaller market potential are often ignored by Big Pharma firms, a
development which has given rise to a class of mid-sized pharmaceutical companies.
Cuatrescasas, with over twenty-five years of R&D operational and company board level
experience at Glaxo Wellcome (and predecessor firm Burroughs Wellcome) and Wamer-
Lambert, refers to the merger and blockbuster phenomena of Big Pharma as "merger mania"
and "blockbuster mania" respectively.29
As to whether mergers of large pharmaceutical firms actually provide long-term benefits over
companies who seek to grow organically, the consulting firm Wood Mackenzie has done some
work in the area to evaluate this question. The firm looked at a basket of selected merger
events as compared to companies that have grown without doing a "megamerger" (e.g., merger
with a company approximately equivalent in size). The merger events were Novartis (a merger
between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz) in 1996, the Astra AB merger with Zeneca in 1998 to create
AstraZeneca (the deal closed in 1999), the merger of Sanofi and Rhone Poulenc to create
Aventis in 1998 (the deal closed in 1999), the Pfizer merger with Warner Lambert in 2000, and
the merger of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham to create GlaxoSmithKline in 2000.
The organic growth companies used in the comparison set were Johnson & Johnson, Eli Lilly,
and Merck. Figure 12 depicts the experiences of both sets of companies.
Figure 12. Comparison of Share Price Performance of Selected Merged Big Pharma
Pharmaceutical Firms and Organic Growth Big Pharma Firms, 1995-2002.
Source: Wood Mackenzie. M& A companies: Novartis, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Pfizer/Warner Lambert, and
GlaxoSmithKline. Organic companies: Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, and Merck.
The same analysis by Wood Mackenzie found that the combined worldwide market shares of
companies heading into a merger were actually higher before the merger, and declined in the
two years following a merger event. This finding suggests that mergers were undertaken to
"solve a growth problem."39 While investors may have come out ahead in the near-term with
respect to cost savings and organizational synergies, the merged company lost market share
and was actually positioned for longer-term challenges of having to develop more blockbuster
products to sustain sales and profit growth once the initial cost savings were realized.
Priorities around drug development programs within a Big Pharma firm can change every few
years, often to the detriment of the firm. For example, given the fairly typical career progression
of pharmaceutical executives, who may be in a role for three years before being promoted or
moved elsewhere, there can be a continuous re-shifting of priorities, such that a program that
was attractive to one executive may be unattractive or undesirable to another, and the new
executive in charge decides to cut the program. In a merger integration environment,
pharmaceutical business leaders may seek to eliminate programs of either entity - the target
firm or the acquiring firm - for a variety of reasons. Anecdotally, numerous executives I
interviewed with Big Pharma backgrounds and who had worked at numerous different Big
Pharma firms suggested that this dynamic of shifting priorities exists within Big Pharma.
Changing priorities every three years or so obviously can have disruptive effects on drug
development activities, especially given that a drug can easily require ten to twelve years of
R&D effort prior to commercialization.
The Investor Outlook on Pharmaceutical Discovery and Drug Development. Investors have
become painfully aware of the challenges facing Big Pharma as well. Indeed, the price-earnings
trading multiples of many Big Pharma firms have declined in recent years and currently reflect
relatively flat to declining expected eamings growth over the next several years, as Figure 13
illustrates. A convergence in price-earnings (PE) multiples in roughly 2011 suggests that
expected growth rates of these Big Pharma firms will converge as well. PEs of the following
firms are charted: Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY), Eli Lilly (LLY), Merck (MRK), Pfizer (PFE),
Schering-Plough (SGP), and Wyeth (WYE).
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Source: Goldman Sachs Equity Research.
Historic valuation analysis of fourteen Big Pharma firms by Accenture shows clearly that
investors have shifted valuation emphasis to a company's cash flow from ongoing operations
and away from its expected future value from operations.40 As Figure 14 shows, since 2000,
investors have become much less risk tolerant as they try to decipher Big Pharma's prospects
for growth based on future product launches. Given increasingly less visibility to firms' future
earnings, investors voted with their feet. Over $500 billion of market value was lost from 2000-
2005 by the fourteen Big Pharma firms in the Accenture study. In addition, we see compound
annual growth in firm current value of 9.9% for the 2000-2005 period, but a decline of 21.0% in









product patent expirations, such as Merck's 2004 withdrawal of Vioxx due to increased health
risks to patients, have no doubt had some effect on the outlook for Big Pharma as well.
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Clearly, then, investors have become attuned to the challenging growth environment facing Big
Pharma. As we have seen, investors are clearly expecting that this environment will intensify
over the next few years. The recent shifts in market valuations of Big Pharma companies
demonstrates that investors have developed greater understanding of the reduced eamings
PUR
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visibility and commensurately high risks associated with drug development faced by Big Pharma
during this time frame. While it is possible that Big Pharma managements have been complicit
in keeping Big Pharma valuations high by touting perhaps unrealistic growth expectations to
Wall Street, most knowledgeable investors have a full understanding of the drug development
process, as well as recognition for the patent expiration environment, which will prove especially
challenging in the 2010-2013 time frame.
Though biotechnology may not have made drug development cheaper, as Pisano suggests,34
and the same could be said of genomic medicine up to this point, Danzon suggests that
biotechnology (the term "biotechnology" here appears to be used as a general reference to
smaller biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies) has "transformed the nature of drug
discovery and the structure of the industry" in that "increasingly, new drugs originate with in
small firms, which often outlicense their products to more experienced firms for later stage drug
development, regulatory review, and commercialization.""41
The Decline of the Role of the Champion. A recent report by Cambridge Healthtech
Associates observes that "hierarchical organizations have the advantage of encouraging the
emergence of product champions, who (if their views turn out to be correct) can turn the whole
company around."42 Given the size of most Big Pharma firms today, however, "they have moved
inexorably towards matrix structures."43 The implication here is that matrix structures are
emblematic of the large, unwieldy, often centralized bureaucracies that exist within many Big
Pharma companies. However, I would make a distinction between organizational configuration
(e.g., matrix or hierarchy) and centralization or decentralization.
In an era of pharmaceutical mega-mergers, Cuatrecasas notes that people are discouraged by
the risk of being wrong. 19 Some Big Pharma firms such as Novartis and Johnson & Johnson
(J&J), are viewed as successful even in an era of ever larger companies, mainly because of
their willingness to pursue different, decentralized organizational approaches.43 In the case of
Novartis, it has organized into a series of fairly integrated, standalone, specialty business units,
such as oncology, primary care, and more mature brands. J&J has long been known for its
decentralized operating structure, which is evidenced by its different pharmaceutical
businesses: Alza, Centocor, Janssen, Ortho-McNeil, and Scios, to name a few.
Big Pharma Response to Recent Pressures
It appears that managements of Big Pharma firms clearly understand the pressures they face
with respect to new product development and commercialization, as evidenced by stepped up
R&D investment activity and a notable increasing trend in partnering activity over the past ten
years (I have cited numerous figures that describe the Big Pharma partnering trend previously).
The bottom line is that Big Pharma management realize that their firms are economically
challenged. While this realization may not prevent future merger activity as a temporary way of
addressing this challenge, a review of the recent literature and my interviews suggest that Big
Pharma executives understand that new ways of doing business, as opposed to merging with
other firms, are required for long-term success.
Is Big Pharma's Loss Small Pharma's Gain?
There is some evidence to suggest that Big Pharma's loss in market valuation has translated
into gains for Small Pharma. Figure 15 depicts the change in recent market capitalization
between leading U.S. pharmaceutical companies (the index consists of Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli
Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Pfizer) and all biotechnology companies (including Amgen
and Genentech). For years 2002 through 2005 there is an appreciable difference in the
performance of these indices, particularly starting in the last quarter of 2003. While movement in
market capitalization - upward or downward - of a handful of the larger biotechnology
companies, such as Amgen and Genentech, can have a pronounced effect on the index, an
increase of over $250 billion is nonetheless dramatic.
Figure 16 looks at the universe of Small Pharma companies relevant to this thesis and
compares their market capitalization to those of the fourteen selected Big Pharma companies
whose market capitalizations were illustrated in Figure 14. Market capitalizations of sixty Small
Pharma companies in all were used. The companies had to be publicly traded in 2002 and
independent for the 2002-2006 time frame for this analysis.



















Figure 16. Market Capitalizations of Small Pharma Firms (n=60) (fist Y axis)
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Source: Author analysis of historic stock price data from Hemscott Americas.
The Looming Challenge for Big Pharma in Sustaining R&D
The question of whether R&D investment in all areas can or will be sustained truly becomes
relevant in a time frame in which Big Pharma is adversely impacted by patent expirations, as it
will be in the years 2010-2013. A look at a basket of the Big Pharma companies is illustrative.
Figure 17 shows the aggregate historic and projected sales (2001-2013) and historic and
projected R&D expenditures (2001-2009) for six companies that will be significantly impacted by
patent expirations in the 2010-2013 time frame: Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Merck, Pfizer,
Schering-Plough, and Wyeth. Will these Big Pharma companies continue to expand their R&D
budgets beyond 2009 when their sales will be negatively impacted by patent expirations?
Historically, Big Pharma companies have either spent less in R&D or only slightly more than the
prior year in a year of sales decline. Several companies, such as Bristol-Myers Squibb and
Pfizer, are at high risk of experiencing several consecutive years of sales declines in the 2010-
2013 period.
Figure 17. Historic and Projected Sales (2001-2013) and R&D Expenditure (2001-2009) for
Six Big Pharma Companies.







C" ITop Line Sales - R& D Spend I
Sources: Company 10-K Filings, 2001-2006; Goldman Sachs equity research; author projections.
Welcome to Niagara Falls: The Impending Wave of Drug Patent Expirations
Clearly the wave of patent expirations on Big Pharma drug products is affecting Big Pharma
economically, and generic drug companies have been the beneficiaries. As illustrated in Figure
18, the number of generic approvals in the U.S. has soared in recent years, and is expected to
continue to do so as many blockbuster products go off patent. Globally, 74 major drugs are
projected to go off patent from 2007-2011."
Figure 18. FDA Generic Drug Approvals, 1999-2005.33
Within the U.S., sales of drugs marketed by U.S. companies during the 2006-2013 time frame
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Figure 19. Historic and Estimated Sales of Drug Products Going off Patent in the U.S.
by Year of Patent Expiration, 2006-2013E.
($ Millions)
2006 2007E 2008E 2009E
Drug/Company Prior Year Sales Dru/Company Prior Year Sales Drug/Company Prior Year Sales Drug/Company Prior Year Sales
Prnvar.hnI/RMY $ 2,300 Norvqasc.!PFE $ 4,700 7Zerit/RMY $ 150 Clarinex/SGP $ 650
Zocor/MRK $ 4,400 Zyrtec/PFE $ 1,600 Fosamax/MRK $ 2,800
Proscar/MRK $ 750 Elocon/SGP $ 150 Trusopt/Cosopt/MRK $ 800
Zoloft/PFE $ 3,300 Camptosar/PFE $ 900
Altace/ WYE/KG $ 500
Total $ 10,750 $ 6,450 $ 5,150 $ 650
2010E 2011E 21012E 2013E
Drug/Company Prior Year Sales Drug/Company Prior Year Sales Drug/Company Prior Year Sales Drug/Company Prior Year Sales
Baraclude/BMY $ 170 Zyprexa/LLY $ 4,100 Avapro/Avalide/BMY $ 1,700 Sustiva/BMY $ 1,100
Cozaar/Hyzaar/lMRK $ 3,200 Zolinza/MRK $ 200 Plavix/BMY $ 5,600 Humalog/LLY $ 1,500
Aricept/PFE $ 400 Lipitor/PFE $ 11,000 Singulair/MRK $ 5,100 Gemzar/LLY $ 1,600
Effexor XR/WYE $ 2,900 Xalatan/PFE $ 1,700 Viagra/PFE $ 2,100 Emend/MRK $ 350
Protnoix/WYE $ 2,100 Caduet/PFE $ 1,000 DetroVPFE $ 800 Propecia/MRK $ 450




Total $ 8,770 $ 18,000 $ 15,700 $ 11,950
Total 2006-2013E $ 77,420
Sources: Company Data, Orange Book, Goldman Sachs Research estimates.








What Has Changed and What Hasn't in Global Pharmaceutical R&D
Clearly, some dynamics of drug development have changed within the past few years.
Investment capital has shifted away from Big Pharma and into smaller companies - a signal
from the market that investors view their product prospects as more compelling. Nonetheless,
on the whole, Big Pharma continues to plow more capital into R&D than ever before. More tools
are available to aid in numerous aspects of drug discovery and drug development, although, as
we have discussed, their availability has not necessarily made the process more efficient or
easier. The reliance of Big Pharma on startup pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies as
new sources of products and technologies has become more pronounced and will likely
accelerate. The challenge of product patent expirations faced by Big Pharma over the next
decade is unprecedented in its magnitude.
Moving or establishing certain functions or operations overseas has become commonplace as
Big Pharma firms seek to outsource certain activities of their businesses. Conducting of clinical
trials is one example of this growing trend. Cockburn found that from 2002-2006, the share of
"traditional" countries where clinical trials are conducted (including Australia, the United States,
countries in Western Europe, and New Zealand) declined from 92.4% to 82.0%.4s Another
example is the exporting of contract research services to locations such as India, eastem
Europe, and elsewhere. Certain economies, specifically those of India and China, are seeing
higher levels of in-house product oriented R&D investment than in the past.
So what hasn't changed? Despite recent efforts of governments and municipalities around the
world to compete in establishing life science knowledge centers, those that have supported
pharmaceutical innovation in the past ten to twenty years remain largely the same. Cockburn's
findings suggest that the landscape of "innovative activity," in which R&D is the most essential
component, is highly concentrated geographically, wherein localized "knowledge spillovers,"
robust patent protection systems, and favorable governmental policies - both national and
regional (ranging from drug price regulation to tax incentives for companies to locate in a given
geography) - have significant influence.45 "Clusters" where pharmaceutical R&D activity is
aggregated seem to be confined to a relatively few geographic metropolitan statistical areas:
Boston; New York/New Jersey/Connecticut; Philadelphia; Research Triangle in North Carolina;
San Diego; the San Francisco Bay Area; the Rhine Valley; suburban London; Stockholm,
Sweden; and Tokyo/Kansei. Other such clusters are certainly emerging around the world and
are vying to attract investment, but historically the few listed above have been the generally
recognized pharmaceutical R&D centers.
Spending by geography has also remained largely consistent. The trend in overall
pharmaceutical global R&D investment across geography, in line with that observed in the
PhRMA data, shows a substantial increase in the total amount of capital invested in R&D since
1990. Indeed, from 1990 to 2004, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the amount of business expenditure in R&D (BERD) in pharmaceuticals
nearly tripled from roughly $17 billion to over $46 billion.45
However, the shares of that investment by geography have remained fairly constant over time.
Figure 20 illustrates this consistency in terms of percentage of global pharmaceutical R&D
spending that each major geographic region represents. Pharmaceutical R&D spending in the
U.S. and the EU-15 nations has consistently stayed at around the 40% level during the time
frame, while spending in Japan has also remained consistent at roughly 15%. Emerging
economies and formerly Soviet bloc countries represent a small but increasing fraction of total
pharmaceutical R&D spending.
R&D (BERD) by Geographic Region, 1990-2004."
Note: All figures determined on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.
Towards Increased Licensing Activity and Collaboration
Given the complexities of new drug discovery and development, as well as the patent expiry
landscape, it is not surprising that Big Pharma has struck more licensing deals recently. Indeed,
such deals are often partnerships that can encompass much more than simply the licensing of
new products; they involve collaborating in numerous parts of the drug development continuum,
including basic science, discovery, drug target validation strategies, genetics, high-throughput
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Figure 20. Business Expenditure in
screening, pharmacogenomics, protein characterization, and proteomics. But while the need is
great for Big Pharma companies in particular to identify new products outside of their own R&D
groups, they remain keenly aware of their own competencies and capabilities. Such awareness
most likely has some influence on Big Pharma firms' licensing decisions, one of the
considerations that gave rise to the hypothesis for this thesis.
Chapter 2. Hypothesis Development and Methods
Given the findings of studies summarized earlier in Figure 2, which suggest that Big Pharma
realizes better rates of clinical and financial success on projects that are in-licensed compared
to those developed internally, this thesis seeks to explore the hypothesis that there is something
different in the way decisions are made in drug development projects in Small Pharma
companies compared to those in Big Pharma on the basis of whether projects are developed
internally or are in-licensed from outside the firm. Are there differences in the perceptions
between executives at Big Pharma and Small Pharma firms about how their firms make project
decisions on the basis of whether a program is developed internally or is licensed in from
outside the firm? Obtaining a comparison of how executives perceived the drug development
decision making process within their firms for each type of project (internally developed versus
in-licensed from outside the firm) was desirable, then, for purposes of this thesis.
The Survey
I developed a survey with the intent of capturing various attributes about interviewees'
perceptions about the decision making process and inputs in the drug development decisions of
their companies for specific projects (See Exhibit 3 for the interview questionnaire). The survey
was designed for two types of interviewees: (1) those with experience working for Big Pharma
companies and (2) those with experience working for Small Pharma companies. Interviewee
perception of their firm's project management based on specific type of project is the unit of
analysis. Thus, the questionnaire asked a series of questions based on these executives'
perceptions about how projects were or are managed in their organizations.
I wanted to understand how prioritization happens within each type of firm and identify the major
functional players engaged in the process. I also sought to capture the resources, tools, and
inputs that interviewees identified as important contributors to the drug development decision
making process within their firms. I hoped to understand from the perception of interviewees
who they perceived as the most influential people (in terms of title) within the organization and
the most important inputs into the drug development decision making process. Moving from the
project level of analysis to the organizational level, I also asked interviewees questions about
their entire project portfolio to provide more insights into the decision making context.
Specifically, I asked interviewees how many projects their companies are currently developing
or were developing at the time they were last with the firm, and the percentage of intemally-
developed projects versus in-licensed projects.
The critical section of the questionnaire for purposes of statistical analysis related to three key
decision points:
* Lead selection/optimization (settling on a lead candidate and choosing to optimize it)
* The decision to move a project from Pre-Clinical testing into Phase I human clinical trials
* The decision to move a project from Phase I human clinical trials into Phase II human
clinical trials.
I asked a series of questions around each of these decision points pertaining to: (1) the decision
making process, (2) the number or types of decision inputs, (3) prioritization, and (4) the metrics
used to evaluate a drug development project. Each of these questions was asked with respect
to whether there were qualitative or quantitative differences on the basis of whether the program
originated inside or outside the company. Lastly, I asked interviewees about their perceptions
about the newness of a technology (e.g., molecule, protein, etc.) and whether its perceived
newness has a positive, negative, or neutral influence on the company's interest level in
pursuing its development.
A few interviewees made the observation that a decision to move a project into Phase I is a
decision to move it into Phase II. Since a Phase I study is conducted simply to establish a drug's
safety, one really cannot learn anything about efficacy until and unless assessing it in a Phase II
trial. For a drug whose safety is established in a Phase I clinical trial, it is indeed true that the
next step is to take it into Phase II clinical trials. However, not all drugs make it through Phase I.
Furthermore, especially in an era of sophisticated tools, such as high-throughput screening and
combinatorial chemistry, firms must often grapple with the question of which candidates to take
into Phase II, and at what dose(s) and formulation, etc.
Testing the Hypothesis
I conducted interviews with 20 people who had worked at 26 different Big Pharma companies. I
considered each Big Pharma experience to be discreet for purposes of data collection (n=25). I
conducted interviews with 17 people who had worked at 12 different Small Pharma companies. I
considered each Small Pharma experience to be discreet for purposes of data collection (n=19).
These people worked in a wide variety of roles within their respective firms. Figure 21 lists the
different roles interviewees have or had within these organizations. Figure 22 lists the numbers
of interviewees from each function within Big Pharma and Small Pharma companies.
Collectively, Big Pharma interviewees had 233 years of experience with their firms, and Small
Pharma interviewees had 84 years of experience in total. Since not all interviewees were able to
answer every question, the total number of responses is given in the results section.
There were five and two interviewees, respectively, in the Big Pharma and Small Pharma data
sets who had experience at two firms within the company data set (e.g., Big Pharma or Small
Pharma). Thus, I conducted two interviews with these people. To assess for possible biasing
effects from such people in the data, in addition to running statistical analysis on all interviewee
data, I ran all statistical analyses on interviewee data sets including data from these individuals
based only on their most recent company experience, thus eliminating one of their interviews. In
doing so, all of the results presented below remain consistent and statistically significant
(p<0.05), albeit at slightly lower p-values and chi-square values.
Figure 21. Functional Roles of Big and Small Pharma Interviewees in Their Organizations.
Business Development Regulatory Affairs
Executive Management (Chairman, CEO*, Research & Development (R&D)****
CFO**, COO***) Sales
Finance Strategic Planning
Legal Supply Chain Management
Market Research Technical Operations (Manufacturing)
Marketing
Notes:
* CEO: chief executive officer
** CFO: chief financial officer
*** COO: chief operating officer
**** R&D included a variety of roles: bench chemistry, chief scientific officer (CSO), discovery,
head (vice president) of R&D, and lead development & optimization.
Figure 22. Number of Big and Small Pharma Interviewees by Function.
Functional Role Big Pharma Small Pharma
Business Development 4 6
Executive Management 2 4
Finance 0 2
Legal 0 1
Market Research 1 0
Marketing 5 1
Regulatory Affairs 0 1
Research & Development 8 4
Sales 1 0
Strategic Planning 1 0
Supply Chain Management 1 0
Technical Operations 2 0
Total 25 19
1 used the Fisher's exact test as well as the Yates' chi-square (X2) test to test the null versus the
alternative hypothesis for a series of questions in my interview survey. The rationale for using
these two tests is that the sample size was not always large enough (e.g., n<10) with respect to
certain responses to the surveys to perform the standard chi-square test. When this situation
occurs, a chi-square test may not be appropriate, since the normal approximation to the
binomial distribution may not be valid. Such is the case especially for small samples.
Interviewee responses to questions about programs on the basis of whether they were
developed intemally or were licensed in from outside the firm were the variables measured.
Additional information on Fisher's exact test and Yates' chi-square test is included in Exhibit 6 in
Chapter 5.
Methods
For the Big Pharma data set, I used those pharmaceutical firms whose R&D budgets placed
them in the top 100 companies worldwide in terms of R&D spend for the years 2000-2004 as
identified by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). This set of companies is
listed in Exhibit 1 in Chapter 5. For Small Pharma, I identified those publicly traded U.S. and
Canadian firms with market capitalizations of less than $5 billion as of December 29, 2006, that
are focused in cancer and autoimmune, cardiovascular, and infectious diseases based on
number of projects in development. I identified people who either had worked or were working at
these firms. Interviewees came from a variety of functional areas, as has been described. I
conducted interviews 25 and 19 interviews with individuals with experience at Big Pharma and
Small Pharma firms, respectively. I conducted interviews in person when possible or via
telephone.
The Hypothesis
For purposes of statistical analysis, the hypotheses are as follows:
Null hypothesis (Ho): There is no difference qualitatively or quantitatively in the way the
company treats drug development projects on the basis of whether the project originated inside
or outside the company [p, = P2].
Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is a difference qualitatively or quantitatively in the way the
company treats drug development projects on the basis of whether the project originated inside
or outside the company [pl # P2].
Interviewee perception of its treatment of drug development projects is the variable tested. For
questions pertaining to in-licensing, Small Pharma interviewees were instructed to consider
initial programs that may have been in-licensed as the basis for company formation as internally
developed projects, since these projects constituted the basis for company formation. In cases
where Small Pharma firms had not in-licensed products, interviewees were asked to consider
how the assessment process of extemal candidates worked, or how they believed it would work.
Only 1 of 19 Small Pharma interviewees indicated that their firm had not at least evaluated
extemal opportunities with the possible intent of in-licensing them.
Results
Exhibits 6 and 7 summarize the data collected in the interviews for Big Pharma and Small
Pharma respectively.
Years of Experience with Firm. With respect to Big Pharma interviewees, the mean
experience time with a Big Pharma firm was 9 years (range 1-26, median 7). The mean
experience time for Small Pharma interviewees was 5 years (rage 0.5-13, median 3). Figure 23
summarizes the results. A high proportion of all interviewees (both Big Pharma and Small
Pharma, n = 45), 42 out of 45, or 93%, reported that they had exposure to the decision making
process for drug development projects at the highest possible levels within their organizations.
Such exposure helped because it provided a basis for comparison for individuals who may have
had responsibility for a given project to compare to the way in which other projects were
managed. Additionally, for those who did not necessarily have project management
responsibility, such exposure provided them with insight into how decision making across
projects was managed.
Figure 23. Interviewee Length of Experience with Big Pharma Firms (n=25) and
Small Pharma Firms (n=19).





Estimated Number of Projects in Development. I asked interviewees to estimate the number
of projects in development within their firms either currently or when they were last with the firm.
The mean estimated number of drug development projects by interviewees (n=25) within Big
Pharma firms was 63 (range, 28-170, median 55). In contrast, for Small Pharma interviewees
(n=19), the mean estimated number of projects in development was 6 (range 1-16, median 4).
These data are summarized in Figure 27 below.
Figure 24. Estimated Number of Drug Development Projects by Firm Type[Big Pharma (n=25), Small Pharma (n=19)].





Estimated Percentages of Projects Developed Internally versus Externally. Within the Big
Pharma interviewee set (n=25), the mean estimated percentage of projects internally developed
was 60% (range 30-90%, median 58%). The mean estimated percentage of projects sourced
externally (i.e., in-licensed from outside the firm) was 40% (range 10-70%, median 42%). These
data are illustrated in Figure 25 below.
Within the Small Pharma interviewee set (n=19), the mean estimated percentage of projects
internally developed was 100.0% (range 0-100%, median 80%). The mean estimated
percentage of projects sourced externally was 20% (range 0-100%, median 20%).
Figure 25. Big Pharma (n=25) and Small Pharma (n=19) Interviewee Estimated
Percentages of Company Projects Sourced Internally and Externally.
Big Pharma Small Pharma
Internally Developed Externally Sourced Internally Developed Externally Sourced
High 90% 70% 100% 100%
Low 30% 10% 0% 0%
Mean 60% 40% 80% 20%
Median 58% 42% 100% 0%
With respect to testing the hypothesis at the three drug development decision points discussed
previously, figures 26 -31 present the results with responses of "Don't Know" or "Not Applicable"
omitted. Figure 26 presents the interviewee results related to lead optimization/selection for the
interview question: "For each of the three decision points above (Lead Optimization/Selection),
does the decision making process for a drug development project differ qualitatively or
quantitatively based on whether it originated inside or outside the company? Based on these
results, I rejected the null hypothesis that Big Pharma and Small Pharma use the same decision
making process in lead selection/optimization with respect to whether it originated inside or
outside the company (p<0.05).
Figure 26. Assessing the Decision Making Process -
Lead Optimization/Selection. '"47
Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Executives Executives
Yes 21 7 28
No 2 11 13
Total 23 18 41
Fisher's exact test: p = 0.0005.
Yates' chi-square value: X2 = 10.5 with p value: p = 0.001.
Using p = 0.05 as the cutoff point, reject Ho (pl = P2) in favor of Hi (ppi p2).
Figure 27 presents the interviewee results about transitioning from pre-clinical to Phase I for the
interview question: "For each of the three decision points above (transitioning a project from pre-
clinical animal studies to phase 1 human clinical studies), does the decision making process for
a drug development project differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether it originated
inside or outside the company?" Based on these results, I rejected the null hypothesis that Big
Pharma and Small Pharma use the same decision making process in transitioning a project
from pre-clinical to Phase I development with respect to whether it originated inside or outside
the company (p<0.05).
Figure 27. Assessing the Decision Making Process -
Transitioning a Project from Pre-Clinical to Phase 1.46, 4
Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Executives Executives
Yes 20 6 26
No 3 12 15
Total 23 18 41
Fisher's exact test: p = 0.0006.
Yates' chi-square value: X2 = 10.3 with p value: p = 0.001.
Using p = 0.05 as the cutoff point, reject Ho (Pl = P2) in favor of H1 (pi * p2).
Figure 28 presents the interviewee results about transitioning a project from Phase I to Phase II
for the interview question: "For each of the three decision points above (the decision to move a
project from phase I human clinical trials into phase II human clinical trials), does the decision
making process for a drug development project differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on
whether it originated inside or outside the company?" Based on these results, I rejected the null
hypothesis that Big Pharma and Small Pharma use the same decision making process in
transitioning a project from pre-clinical to Phase I development with respect to whether it
originated inside or outside the company (p < 0.05).
Figure 28. Assessing the Decision Making Process -
Transitioning a Project from Phase I to Phase II.46.47
Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Executives Executives
Yes 21 6 27
No 2 10 12
Total 23 16 39
Fisher's exact test: p = 0.0005.
Yates' chi-square value: X2 = 10.4 with p value: p = 0.001.
Using p = 0.05 as the cutoff point, reject Ho (Pi = P2) in favor of H1 (pl # P2).
Interviewee responses to the questions behind Figures 26 through 28 reveal perspective on
how executives from both Big Pharma and Small Pharma view decision making around drug
development projects. A Big Pharma executive summarized the Big Pharma's productivity
challenge in much the same way that industry analysts view it: "For (Big Pharma) companies,
their discovery efforts are not as successful as they have been in the past." Others affirmed that
some Big Pharma companies set a higher bar for making a decision to in-license projects than
they do for internally developed projects. According to a long-time Big Pharma executive: "(The
Big Pharma company) was much more conservative in bringing products in from the outside."
Said another: "I know the bar was much higher for bringing projects in from the outside."
As the data from Figures 26 through 28 shows, a majority of Small Pharma executives see no
qualitative or quantitative difference in the ways in which their firms make decisions around
three key drug development decision points. One Small Pharma executive spoke for many in
saying: "The decision making process is no different. It is transparent." Many Small Pharma
interviewees also expressed a desire for more market information on any project - whether
internal or external. Said one Small Pharma executive: "There is always more hunger for data
around the market opportunity."
Big Pharma executives cited a preference to develop a project within their firms as opposed to
going outside to in-license it. According to one Big Pharma executive: "It's harder to decide to
pursue early stage (in-licensing) programs if we haven't convinced ourselves we can't do it." In
contrast, a Small Pharma company executive described the opportunistic nature of going
outside to in-license products: "For us, it was opportunistically driven to a large extent."
Figure 29 presents the interviewee results about number or types of decision inputs on the basis
of internal or external development for the interview question: "For each of the three decision
points above, does the number or types of decision inputs the company uses differ qualitatively
or quantitatively based on whether the product or program was developed internally or
extemally?" Based on these results, I rejected the null hypothesis that Big Pharma and Small
Pharma use the same number or types of decision inputs qualitatively or quantitatively based on
whether a project was developed intemally or externally (p<0.05).
Figure 29. Assessing Differences in Numbers or Types of Decision Inputs of
a Drug Development Project on the Basis of
Whether It Was Developed Internally or Externally.46' 47
Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Executives Executives
Yes 19 7 26
No 2 12 14
Total 21 19 40
Fisher's exact test: p = 0.0007.
Yates' chi-square value: X2 = 10.4 with p value: p = 0.001.
Using p = 0.05 as the cutoff point, reject Ho (Pi = P2) in favor of H1(pl # P2).
A Big Pharma executive observed: "There are many more people involved in product
acquisitions and licensing deals. They consume more resources in terms of cost, organizational
effort, and impact." In contrast, a majority of Small Pharma executives did not see a qualitative
or quantitative difference in the numbers or types of decision inputs.
Figure 30 presents the interviewee results of firm prioritization for the interview question: "For
each of the three decision points above, does the prioritization of a drug development project
differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether it originated inside or outside the
company? Based on these results, I rejected the null hypothesis that there is no difference
qualitatively or quantitatively between Big Pharma and Small Pharma in prioritization of projects
based on whether a project was developed internally or extemally (p<0.05).
Figure 30. Assessing Prioritization of a Drug Development Project on the Basis of
Whether It Originated Inside or Outside the Company.46'47
Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Executives Executives
Yes 22 5 27
No 2 14 16
Total 24 19 43
Fisher's exact test: p = 0.0005.
Yates' chi-square value: X2 = 10.6 with p value: p = 0.001.
Using p = 0.05 as the cutoff point, reject Ho (Pi = P2) in favor of H1 (pl * P2).
An overwhelming majority of Big Pharma executives saw a qualitative or quantitative difference
in prioritization within their firms based on whether the project originated inside or outside the
company. Financial considerations were cited by several Big Pharma executives as one of the
ways in which they observed a difference. "There is more preferential treatment for compounds
for which the company has paid a lot of money," stated one. Said another: "If senior
management backs an outside product or program and spends a lot of money to get it, then
they will be watching the program more closely" compared to an intemally developed program.
Another Big Pharma executive observed: "People felt the cost more acutely as a result of having
spent money" on an outside program.
Big Pharma executives also cited organizational and personal biases as well as politics as ways
in which they saw differences in decision making treatment. "An inside development project's
content was always suspect," observed a Big Pharma executive. "Personal bias was huge,"
observed another. "It (the decision making process) could and did vary at all three stages. It was
very often politically driven," another remarked.
A majority of Small Pharma executives observed that their firms did not have the financial
latitude of being able to prioritize one program over another. One Small Pharma executive put it
this way: 'We don't have the luxury of looking at fifty candidates. There is one decision making
group, an 'n' of one." Another cited science as the key driver of decisions for projects regardless
of whether they originated inside or outside the company: "Science would always drive the
process."
Figure 31 presents the interviewee results of firm metrics for the interview question: "For each of
the three decision points above, do the metrics used to evaluate a drug development project
differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether it originated inside or outside the
company?" Based on these results, I rejected the null hypothesis that the metrics used do not
differ qualitatively or quantitatively between Big Pharma and Small Pharma based on whether a
project originated inside or outside the company (p<0.5).
Figure 31. Assessing the Metrics Used to Evaluate a Drug Development Project on the
Basis of Whether It Originated Inside or Outside the Company.' 4
Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Executives Executives
Yes 17 5 22
No 6 14 20
Total 23 19 42
Fisher's exact test: p = 0.003.
Yates' chi-square value: X2 = 7.6 with p value: p = 0.006.
Using p = 0.05 as the cutoff point, reject Ho (Pl = P2) in favor of H1 (pi * P2).
While not as overwhelming as the previous result, a solid majority of Big Pharma executives
nonetheless also reported that the metrics their firms used differed qualitatively or quantitatively
on the basis of whether a program originated inside or outside the company. Observed one Big
Pharma executive: "For an inbound project from the outside, the company may want higher
numbers (hurdle rates, etc.)." Another suggested that "there was much more flexibility around
internal programs, and that can be good and bad."
In contrast, a majority of Small Pharma executives found no difference in the metrics their firms
used to evaluate a project on the basis of whether it originated inside or outside the company.
Said one: 'We had to be non-parochial in our approach to build value. We had to be
unemotionally involved." Many Small Pharma executives also described using fewer metrics
than their Big Pharma counterparts.
Newness of Technology. I also asked interviewees whether the newness of a given
technology was viewed as positive, negative, or neutral in terms of its impact on the company's
interest level in pursuing the project. Within Big Pharma interviewees (n=26), 77% (20 out of 26)
viewed newness of technology as having a positive impact on the company's interest level, 15%
(4 out of 26) responded they did not know, and 8% (2 out of 26) viewed the impact as neutral.
By contrast, within Small Pharma interviewees (n=19), only 52% (10 out of 19) viewed newness
of technology as having a positive impact on the company's interest level, 37% (7 out of 19)
viewed it as neutral, and 11% (2 out of 19) viewed it as negative. It is noteworthy that not one
Big Pharma interviewee viewed a new technology as having a negative impact on his or her
firm's interest level in pursuing it.
Chapter 3: Findings
Discussion of Results
Based on my interviews of executives from Big Pharma and Small Pharma, these results
suggest some pronounced differences in the ways in which the two types of companies manage
drug development projects on the basis of whether a program originated inside or outside the
company. At high levels of statistical significance, on the basis of both the Fisher's exact test
and the Yates' chi-square test, my analysis finds statistically significant differences in decision
making between Big Pharma and Small Pharma across four variables, noted in Chapter 2.
These data indicate that decision making around drug development projects is managed
differently by the two classes of firms, whether intentionally or not. Figures 25-30 show that a
consistently strong majority of Small Pharma interviewees responded that their firms' approach
to decision making with respect to a project essentially did not or would not differ on the basis of
whether the project originated internally or externally. Conversely, an overwhelming majority of
Big Pharma executives generally perceived a difference in the ways their firms approached
project decision making on the basis or project origination.
From my interviews, it appears that there are a variety of factors that may contribute to this
difference. These factors come out of interviewee responses to various questions that I asked.
While this discussion will be more qualitative in nature (e.g., it was not my intention within the
context of this thesis to evaluate such factors on a statistical basis), these factors emerged as
themes from the same interviewees whose responses showed a statistical difference between
the Big Pharma and Small Pharma approaches to drug development project decision making.
Thus, these factors appear important in potentially explaining the differences observed.
Small Pharma Firms are Able to Focus. Small Pharma executives identified focus as a key
factor in why their firms treat drug development projects the same way. Usually operating under
significant capital constraints, especially compared to their Big Pharma counterparts, Small
Pharma executives are forced to consider decisions carefully and make the best possible
decisions with the information they have at the time. While Big Pharma seeks to operate in the
same manner, a number of Big Pharma executives suggested that Big Pharma is more willing to
wait to have more complete information before making decisions regarding drug development
programs. It can be argued that the risks to a Big Pharma firm with respect to making a wrong
decision are greater in terms of total dollars. Generally speaking, Big Pharma's opportunity cost
is far higher than that of a Small Pharma firm. In other words, if a Big Pharma firm elects to go
through with Phase 2 (and subsequent Phase 3) trials for a given drug, its opportunity cost is far
higher if the project fails, since presumably it could have invested that capital in an alternative
program with a more favorable and profitable outcome. By contrast, Small Pharma executives
did not talk about alternative projects to the few their firms were actively pursuing or
considering, since because they were cash and resource constrained, such trade-offs came into
play much less frequently than in Big Pharma firms.
Whereas Big Pharma firms are more likely to have plenty of cash to invest in programs, and
thus have the luxury of selecting a portfolio of projects to pursue out of a much larger potential
universe, Small Pharma executives generally described an environment in which they were
challenged to find creative, resourceful, and inexpensive ways to pursue even the one or small
handful of projects they were developing. I do not mean to suggest that Big Pharma has more
cash than it needs, since Big Pharma firms still have to choose those projects they wish to
pursue among many alternatives. However, having so many more choices than their Smaller
Pharma counterparts suggests that Big Pharma firms have a greater challenge in determining
which projects are the best alternatives and offer the best returns. This challenge faced by Big
Pharma associated with selecting projects from a wide range of alternatives may be one of the
reasons that Big Pharma and Small Pharma interviewees alike described the slow pace with
which Big Pharma makes decisions about projects. It may also help explain why Big Pharma is
willing to wait longer to get a slightly higher level of confidence around a given project before
making a decision to pursue it or not.
Clearly, the numbers of projects each class of companies is developing at any given time is
vastly different. As Figure 23 illustrates, Big Pharma firms on average are developing an
estimated 63 projects compared to an estimated 6 projects within their Small Pharma
counterparts, and many of the Big Pharma projects are at later stages of development, so the
expenditures associated with them are greater. The sheer mass of project content that must be
managed is orders of magnitude larger in Big Pharma firms compared to Small Pharma firms.
Not All Small Pharma Firms In-License Products. From my Small Pharma interviewee set,
only 8 of 19 interviewees, or 42%, indicated that their companies had in-licensed products.
However, of the 8 that did, a majority in all cases indicated that there was no difference in the
way their firms managed the decision making process while a minority indicated that there were
differences. Figure 31 provides the p values for such results shown in Figures 25-20 using only
the responses from those interviewees whose firms had in-licensed a product. The values
remain statistically significant for a cut-off of p < 0.05. It could be argued that Small Pharma
executives whose firms have not in-licensed products might hypothesize that their firms would
not treat decision making around drug development projects (internally developed versus
sourced externally) differently, but such an argument appears inconsistent with these data.
Figure 32. Summary of p Values Using Fisher's Exact Test and Yates' Chi-Square Test
Comparing Big Pharma to Small Pharma Interview Responses Using Only Small Pharma
Data from Those Executives Whose Firms Had In-Licensed Products.
p-values
Variable Fisher's Exact Test Yates' Chi-Square Test
Decision Making Process
Lead Selection/Optimization P = 0.005 p = 0.007
Pre-Clinical Trials to Phase I P = 0.002 p = 0.003
Human Clinical Trials
Phase 1 to Phase 2 Human P = 0.002 p = 0.003
Clinical Trials
Number or Types of p = 0.001 p = 0.002
Decision Inputs
Prioritization p = 0.00006 p = 0.00008
Metrics p = 0.003 p = 0.007
Every Decision is Important to the Small Pharma Firm. Boards of Small Pharma firms
appear to be more involved in project-specific decisions compared to boards of Big Pharma
firms. The total dollar value of such Small Pharma decisions may be smaller than for a Big
Pharma firm, but to the Small Pharma firm, those decisions are viewed as critically important.
While on the one hand this may lead to increased oversight from the board or executive levels,
better decisions may result due to such involvement. It is easy to make the case that in such
settings, with more hands-on involvement, projects teams are more accountable, and are
therefore less likely to slip on or miss deliverables and deadlines. By contrast, within the Big
Pharma environment, several Big Pharma interviewees commented that they saw programs
(projects) get killed that they believed should not have, while programs that should not have
been taken all the way through the development process were. Given the sheer mass of Big
Pharma firms, the same level of corporate scrutiny that seems to exist within Small Pharma
firms is not possible, and, indeed, not every decision within Big Pharma is as important on a
relative basis. Considering Pfizer, for example, with an R&D budget projected at over $7.5
billion in 2007, the degree of focus on any given project, particularly at the board of directors
level, is simply impossible. By comparison, boards of Small Pharma firms enjoy an ability to get
into much more detail with their firms' projects than those of Big Pharma.
Politics Is Less of a Factor within Small Pharma. Small Pharma executives did not mention
organizational politics with the same frequency as Big Pharma interviewees as having a role in
drug development decision making. 19 out of 23, or 83% of Big Pharma interviewees cited
organizational politics as a factor in drug development decision making, whereas only 2 out of
20, or 10% of Small Pharma interviewees cited it as a factor. I did not specifically seek to
measure the degree of influence politics had, and, indeed, for nearly all interviewees, 44 out of
46, or 96%, politics was cited as having less than 50% of the overall influence in drug
development project decisions. Given the information provided, it is difficult to determine exactly
what impact of influence organizational politics may have in decision making, although clear
differences exist.
Career Considerations Come into Play, Especially within Big Pharma. Numerous
interviewees touched on various aspects of career considerations in decision making around
drug development projects. A few Big Pharma interviewees noted the challenges Big Pharma
has with killing projects because certain science staff members have long histories - up to 10 to
12 years in some cases. The idea of killing a project that is the basis for a scientist's life work
certainly presents a challenge. Big Pharma interviewee responses raised questions around
incentives and compensation of those involved with drug development projects - as to whether
the goal was to get a project approved or to achieve targeted profitability of projects launched.
The other career aspect that several Big Pharma interviewees touched upon was the desire of
high level executives to avoid making bad decisions based on the perceptions of their peers and
superiors. Risk taking on the whole does not seem to be widely encouraged within Big Pharma
firms. This risk-averse mindset may in part play a role in Big Pharma setting "a higher bar" for
projects they seek to in-license from the outside (see below) compared to those they develop
internally. An implication for Big Pharma firms is that if their senior executives feel they cannot
take risks because of a belief that failures may lead to career derailment, then these firms may
miss new, innovative scientific advances and opportunities. Or they may pay more later to
license or acquire them from a smaller, early stage company that was willing to take such risk.
The Decision Point is Less Meaningful than the General Approach to Decision Making. If
a respondent gave a certain answer to one decision point of the three I assessed, he or she was
virtually certain (n = 46 out of 48 respondents, or 96% of all interviewees) to answer the same
way with respect to the other two decision points. This suggests that the framework of decision
making and approach to it within a firm is more important than the specific decision point itself in
influencing whether programs are treated differently on the basis of originating inside or outside
the firm. Based on Big Pharma interviews, it appears that the Big Pharma operating
environment is much more deliberative about getting even slightly more information - even if it
requires waiting a few more weeks or even months for that information. This willingness to wait
may be in part a result of the risk averse dynamic that several Big Pharma interviewees
described.
Big Pharma Sets a Higher Bar for In-licensing Projects. Several Big Pharma interviewees (3
out of 26, or 12%) indicated that their firms have higher standards of acceptability when
assessing products as potential in-licensing candidates compared to internally developed
projects. Several others indicated that there would be a greater comfort organizational level with
technologies or fields with which their R&D organizations had familiarity or expertise. Big
Pharma executives gave several reasons for applying a different set of standards. The potential
licensor firm's people do not generally have as much familiarity or experience with the program,
so there is inherently more skepticism about whether the work that has been done is
acceptable. A few Big Pharma executives also suggested that Small Pharma firms tend to do
less rigorous work on their drug development projects. Another cause for giving higher scrutiny
to outside projects is the fact that Big Pharma firm executives knew substantial milestone
payments would be required up front, and that the partnering firm would hold their firm more
accountable through a contract than would otherwise occur within their own firm in developing
the project.
At Some Point, Small Pharma Starts to Act Like Big Pharma. For Small Pharma firms, the
stage of a firm seems to affect perception of decision making in that firm. For example, if the
firm was relatively established with late stage or commercial products, its people might start
behaving more like those in a Big Pharma firm, in which emotional attachment to intemally
developed programs was cited with greater frequency. Also, in some cases, Small Pharma
interviewees indicated their firms would set a higher bar for bringing in programs from the
outside, just as some Big Pharma executives had stated. For Small Pharma executives whose
firms had a market capitalization of less than $100 million, this was less the case than for those
whose firms had market capitalizations of $500 million or more.
Within Small Pharma, Project Quality Can be Sacrificed in the Name of Speed or
Financial Discipline. Several Big Pharma interviewees indicated that they believe Small
Pharma firms sometimes do less work or less rigorous work for a given project than their Big
Pharma counterparts. Obviously, financial constraints are far greater in Small Pharma firms than
in Big Pharma. Secondly, if the Small Pharma firm's goal is ultimately to out-license or sell a
project (or the firm itself) to Big Pharma, then the clinical milestone that the Small Pharma firm
seeks to achieve may very well be short of product regulatory approval and launch. For Big
Pharma, the end goal is nearly always regulatory approval and product launch. In a market of
constrained supply and unprecedented demand on the part of Big Pharma, it is unclear how
much "cutting of corners" on projects truly impacts Small Pharma firms.
Planning is Highly Fluid for Small Pharma Firms. Within Small Pharma firms, decisions
around project prioritization appear to happen with much greater fluidity and much more rapidly
than within Big Pharma firms. Small Pharma firms were much more wiling to make strategic
shifts with respect to the business than Big Pharma firms. Some of the reasons for this flexibility
are obvious. For Big Pharma, with massive deployed marketing and sales organizations
focused on specific therapeutic areas or physician call points, selling a portfolio of products, the
fate of one project does not dictate the firm's future or have anywhere near the same degree of
impact on the firm's viability as it might within Small Pharma. Several Small Pharma executives
noted that being public certainly exerts constraints on their firms - in terms of funding "skunk
works" projects, as an example. For a small market capitalization company, funding of such
projects may attract the scrutiny of outside investors. Nonetheless, Small Pharma firms must be
positioned to take full advantage of flexibility. A poor clinical result may force a Small Pharma
firm to change its strategy dramatically or close its doors.
The Time Frame within a Firm Can Impact One's Perspective Significantly. For both sets of
firms, Big Pharma and Small Pharma, impressions of how the firm made or makes decisions
could be impacted by the time frame in which the interviewee worked with the firm. As an
example, Pfizer in the 1970's operated much differently from the way it does so today. Similarly,
the Small Pharma firm that had high hopes for a certain technology in the early 1990's only to
watch it fail in late stage clinical trials has moved on to other projects with a different strategic
focus - and management team - today.
Functional Role Can Also Impact Perspective Significantly. The functional role one plays in
a firm and level within the organization also impact one's perceptions about how project
decisions are made. In a couple of cases, I interviewed executives within the same firm who had
totally different perceptions about the firm's strategies or core competencies. Despite such
differences, they answered my interview questions the same way, meaning that while their
perceptions of certain organizational attributes could vary widely, they did not vary with respect
to firm treatment of drug development programs on the basis of internal development or in-
licensing from the outside.
Newness of Technology: A Conundrum. As mentioned previously, 77% of Big Pharma
executives and 52% of their Small Pharma counterparts viewed newness of technology (e.g.,
first in therapeutic class, new molecule, biologic, etc.) as having a positive influence on their
firm's interest in pursuing it. 8% and 37%, respectively, viewed it as having a neutral impact.
From my interviews with Small Pharma executives, it seemed that more of their ambivalence
about a technology's newness related to an appreciation for the work - scientifically, clinically,
and financially - that had to be done relative to the new technology. Invariably, regulatory
agencies have more questions regarding technologies that they haven't seen before. The
overwhelming Big Pharma view of new technology as having a positive impact on firm interest
level raises the question of whether such new technologies are worth the risk or not for smaller,
early stage firms to develop. In doing so, they could license or partner such projects with Big
Pharma firms at a later stage, presumably for substantial financial terms. However, while the
regulatory environment always represents uncertainty for novel technology, it may be even
more the case in the current environment due to recent findings of health issues with marketed
drugs, such as Vioxx from Merck, or possible health concerns over Avandia from
GlaxoSmithKline.
Chapter 4: Limitations and Insights
In any survey of people, different individuals will perceive questions and definitions differently.
Organizational definitions can often be challenging, especially given the complex composition of
businesses. For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), while mainly a pharmaceutical company,
maintains a medical device division, ConvaTec. Yet BMS is routinely referred to as a Big
Pharma company, which makes sense because BMS' medical device revenues, at roughly $1
billion per year, are clearly a minority of the firm's $18 billion annual sales. The definition of Big
Pharma becomes more complicated with Johnson & Johnson (J&J). It can be argued that J&J is
not truly a "Big Pharma" company. After all, J&J has very significant businesses in medical
devices and diagnostics (MD&D), as well as consumer products. J&J eams a very substantial
portion of its revenues and profits from these "non-pharmaceutical" businesses. J&J is
sometimes discussed in the literature as a Big Pharma firm, and sometimes is conspicuously
absent for the reason previously given.
In addition, other definitions in my survey required occasional clarification. Specifically, the
concept of "difference in metrics" required clarification in five (5/46 = 11%) interviews. The need
for clarification arose because the phrase could be interpreted to mean different "metrics" or
measures of some aspect of a project (e.g., pharmacokinetic profile, pharmacodynamic profile,
market opportunity, extent of unmet medical need, etc.) in which different metrics could be
applied (e.g., a firm could use metrics a, b, and c for an internally developed program, while
using metrics c, d, and e for an externally developed program) whereas the term "difference"
could be interpreted by the interviewee as requiring emphasis (e.g., using the same metric -
market opportunity - a firm might require a market opportunity of $500 million for an internally
developed program and a market opportunity of $1 billion for an in-licensed program that
originated externally).
While different interviewees may have focused on different aspects of certain interview
questions, the benefit of having a large sample size is to be able to identify the perceptual
patterns that exist. The findings in this thesis are certainly suggestive that there are differences
in the ways different firms manage drug development projects on the basis of whether they
originated inside or outside the firm. They also raise questions about how we may seek to better
understand these dynamics in the future.
What Happens in Mid-Sized Pharma Firms?
In this thesis, I explicitly undertook to assess whether there were differences between Small
Pharma firms, publicly traded companies with market capitalizations of less than $5 billion, and
Big Pharma firms, which have market capitalizations in the tens and hundreds of billions of
dollars. A question my findings raise is: What happens in mid-sized pharma firms? For
companies with market capitalizations of $10 to $20 billion, are there differences in the way
these firms manage drug development projects on the basis of project origination (internal or
external to the firm). Genzyme is a company that would qualify as a mid-sized firm based on the
market capitalization range posited above. What might we learn about how Genzyme treats
decision making for these two types of drug development projects? Or is the "mid-sized firm" for
purposes of this analysis much smaller in size? It may be. It is well worth knowing at what point
the small, early stage pharmaceutical company starts to morph into the bigger pharmaceutical
company with respect to project decision making.
The Market's Quest for Efficiency
While the current state of R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry has its critics, it
seems reasonable to consider that the current drug development landscape may, in fact, be the
result of the market seeking optimal efficiency. With numerous startup and early stage life
science companies being established, funded by abundant venture financing, clearly investors
are willing to take on the risks associated with drug development for the prospect of making
spectacularly high returns. Moreover, the current trend in which the exit event for venture
backed firm via merger or acquisition by a larger Big Pharma is virtually de rigeur in today's
market environment suggests that investors are not necessarily betting on an initial public
offering (IPO), and believe that it is necessary only to get products through to proof of principle
before a Big Pharma company will decide to acquire the small firm in question.
Implications for Future Study
Thinking ahead to future assessment that may be done in the area of pharmaceutical R&D
productivity, it will be important to look at what new business models are evolving to meet the
needs for new products in the pharmaceutical marketplace. Will it make sense, as some whom I
interviewed suggested, for Big Pharma firms to focus on late stage (i.e., Phase 3) development
and commercialization of new therapies? Should Big Pharma firms increasingly let smaller,
early stage firms do the high-risk, early assessment and validation work on drug development
projects before deciding to pursue them?
Assessing the challenges of managing alliances is a worthwhile endeavor as well. Few would
doubt the increasing reliance of Big Pharma firms on licensing deals, partnerships, and the like
with outside firms. Understanding how such collaborations are best managed has enormous
implications for the pharmaceutical industry.
Lastly, what are the implications for the Small Pharma firm today that aspires to be the Big
Pharma firm of tomorrow? In whose footsteps will they seek to follow - Amgen, Genentech,
Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, Pfizer, or a different company? Is it possible to avoid an attack of
generics upon patent expiration for a given product? If so, how? Are centralized or decentralized
models of firm organization more appropriate for Big Pharma firms? What are the right metrics
for bolstering drug development portfolio success? Future studies will need to grapple with
these questions.
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(Definition: Those pharmaceutical companies whose R&D budgets placed them in the top 100



















Source: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE): IEEE Spectrum: December,
2005.
Exhibit 2.
Small, Publicly Traded U.S. and Canadian Pharma and Biotech Companies with a















































































































Small, Publicly Traded U.S. and Canadian Pharma and Biotech Companies with a
Majority of Programs in Cancer & Autoimmune, Cardiovascular, andlor Infectious
Diseases (n=99)*
* Notes accompanying chart:
(1) For purposes of this thesis, "Small Pharma" companies have a market capitalization of equal to or less
than $5 billion U.S. as of December 29, 2006.
(2) Corautus Genetics announced a merger with privately held VIA Pharmaceuticals on June 4, 2007.
(3) It was announced on December 21, 2006, that Praecis Pharmaceuticals was being acquired by
GlaxoSmithKline.
(4) Note: GlycoGenesis filed a voluntary petition to restructure under Chapter 11 the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts on February 3, 2006. The company is
no longer publicly traded.
(5) Bio-Imaging Technologies, Inc. is a publicly traded contract research organization that has served a
substantial number of Big Pharma and Small Pharma clients in the cancer & autoimmune,
cardiovascular disease therapeutic areas. I interviewed the chief executive officer of this company
because of its intimate familiarity with drug development decision making processes at both Big
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Materials Received (e.g., documents, files, etc.) Yes I] No -1
Other Comments on Setting, Interviewee Demeanor & Attitude
EI Introduce Investigator:
EI Informed Consent and Confidentiality Statement
* Your participation in this interview is voluntary
* You may decline to answer any question
* You may withdraw from the interview at any time
* All answers are confidential in that no identifying information (your name, company name,
organization names, drug name, type) will be presented in any written or oral report.
O- Purpose and Procedure Statement
* Conducting semi-structured interviews with large pharmaceutical companies ("Big
Pharma") and small, publicly traded biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in the
U.S. and Canada with a majority of drug development programs in cancer & autoimmune
diseases and cardiovascular disease ("Small Pharma").
o The interview should not take longer than one hour.
o The purpose of this research is to explore the ways in which different companies
manage decision making and prioritization of their drug development projects.
o Specifically, I am interested in understanding if you perceive(d) any differences in
the decision making and/or prioritization around drug development programs
based on whether they were sourced internally or externally (e.g., were in-
licensed from the outside).
o Your specific function or role within the organization is less important than
whether you had exposure to the company's decision making and prioritization
processes around drug development programs at some level (e.g., project
specific, therapeutic category or division, or corporate).
o We will first start with a few questions about your background at the company
and the roles you have played within it. This should take about five minutes or so.
* Your candid responses are important.
* All of this information is strictly confidential and any data presented in journals will be
scrubbed of your company name, individuals, product names, or any other labels that
could identify you or your company.
Ol General Definitions Given
* Lead Selection/Optimization, Pre-Clinical, Phase I, Phase II.
Individual Background and Role
1. For purposes of this interview, is the company you work(ed) for a Big Pharma or Small Pharma?
2. How long have you worked at or did you work at this company? If you are no longer at the
company, when you did last work there?
3. What is / was your role in the company? What other roles have you or did you work in?
4. At what level(s) could you observe your company's activities relating to program decision
making and prioritization? Select all that apply.
Project Level 1O Therapeutic Category or Division Level - Corporate Level O
Drug Development Projects at Your Company
5. How many projects is this company actively developing currently or was it developing when you
were last there?
6. How does the company prioritize projects? What is the organizational process by which it does
so?
7. Is prioritizing typically done on a cyclical (e.g., once a year, twice a year) basis?
8. Does a meeting usually take place for purposes of prioritization? If so, which corporate functions
are usually present?
9. Who typically presents at such meetings?
10. What resources, in terms of information and/or personnel, are essential for the discussion?
11. What information is nice to have but is not always available at such discussions?
12. Are there specific tools or inputs that your company uses to evaluate drug development
projects? If so, what are they?
13. If you had to quantify in rough percentages the different inputs into a decision around a particular






14. Is this distribution representative for most projects in your organization?
15. How would you say your organization balances these different factors? Are there occasions when
one factor weighs more than in others (e.g., significant financial opportunity versus strategic fit for
a given program)?
16. Within your organization, who are the most influential people in these decisions?
17. What do you consider to be the most important decision inputs in managing drug development?
18. Can you estimate the percentage of your company's projects that were developed
internally? What percentage were licensed or acquired from outside the company?
Decision Points in Drug Development Projects
In answering questions 19-22, please consider with respect to each of the following three decision points:
A. Lead Selection/Optimization
B. The decision to move a project from Pre-Clinical to Phase I
C. The decision to move a project from Phase I to Phase II
19. For each of the three decision points above, does the decision making process for a drug
development project differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether it originated inside or
outside the company?
20. For each of the three decision points above, does the number or types of decision inputs the
company uses differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether the product or program was
developed internally or externally?
21. For each of the three decision points above, does the prioritization of a drug
development project differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether it originated
inside or outside the company?
22. For each of the three decision points above, do the metrics used to evaluate a drug
development project differ qualitatively or quantitatively based on whether it originated inside or
outside the company?
Decision Inputs and Influencers
23. In general, what are the decision inputs the company relies upon to make these decisions?
24. Is there usually a given champion within the organization for a development project?
25. If so, is there a formal or informal process or way by which that individual or group of individuals
goes about soliciting internal support for programs? From your perspective, is there a difference
in the way that process works based on whether the program was sourced internally or
externally?
26. To what extent does the "newness" of a program or molecule (in terms of technology) impact your











































































Maria Grunwald, Audact, Inc.
Exhibit 5. Fisher's Exact Test and Yates' Chi Square Test.
Fisher's Exact Test. Fisher's exact test for 2 x 2 tables applies to members from two
independent groups (e.g., Big Pharma, Small Pharma) which can fall into one of two mutually
exclusive categories (e.g., Yes or No). It is often used to test statistical significance when
sample sizes are small (n < 10 for a given outcome). The calculation for Fisher's exact test for a
two by two matrix is given in Figure 33 below.
Figure 33. Hypergeometric Distribution of the Exact Probability of Observing a Table with
Cells a, b, c, and d.
a4-b c+ /d n (a + b)! (c + d)!(a + c)0(b + d)!
S a c / a + c nla!b!cid!
where p is the probability of a specific set of outcomes within the matrix; a, b, c, and d are the
outcomes; and i is a factorial operator. Fisher's exact test assumes that the numbers are fixed.
In other words, using the 2 x 2 table below (Figure 34), the numbers of Yes and No responses
are fixed at a + b and c + d, respectively. (Note: n = the sum of a + b + c + d.)
Figure 34. General Layout of Fisher's Exact Test.48
Type of Firm
Response Big Pharma Small Pharma Total
Yes a b a+b
No c d c+d
Total a + c b + d n
Fisher's exact test is used to calculate the probability, given observed marginal frequencies, of
obtaining exactly the same frequencies observed as well as any configuration that is more
extreme (i.e., having a smaller probability of occurrence). For purposes of this thesis, a one-
tailed test is applicable as opposed to a two tailed test.
Yates' Chi-Square Test. Yates' chi square test is given by Figure 35.
Figure 35. Yates' Chi-Square Test.49
Yates' chi-square test is used because when there is one degree of freedom, as in Figure 23
above, small frequencies can create bias in the traditional chi-square test. Therefore, Yates'
correction of subtracting 0.5 from observed differences of the observed and expected
frequencies has the effect of reducing the chi-square value and increasing the resulting p value,
effectively making the result more conservative. Some suggestion has been made that the
Yates correction yields an overly conservative test in which one may fail to reject a false null
hypothesis, which is one of the reasons I also run the Fisher's exact test on the data. As with
Fisher's exact test, Yates' chi-square test may be appropriate when one or more cells have
frequencies of less than five.
The Yates' chi-square statistic can be re-written in a slightly more convenient version that does
not require full computation of the expected table. The short form of the equation for a 2x2
contingency table such as that in Figure 34 is given by the equation in Figure 36 below.
Figure 36. Short Computational Form for Yates Corrected Chi-Square Test for 2 x 2
Contingency Tables.49
X2 = n (lad - bcl - n/2)2 I/ [(a + b) (c + d) (a + c) (b + d)]
Both the Fisher's exact test and the Yates' chi-square test were run on responses to selected
questions from the interview survey.
Exhibit 6. Big Pharma Executive Interview Data.
Estimated Difference in
Interview Number Years with Projects in Percentage of Programs Developed Decision Making Process Differs Number/Types of Difference in Difference in
Company Development Internally Externally A B C Decision Inputs Prioritization Metrics
1 5.0 100 0.60 0.40 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 3.0 125 0.60 0.40 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 7.0 70 0.58 0.42 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 26.0 125 0.30 0.70 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 3.0 40 0.50 0.50 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
6 7.0 40 0.90 0.10 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
7 3.0 55 0.70 0.30 No No No Don't Know Yes Don't Know
8 17.0 - 0.38 0.63 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9 18.0 250 0.90 0.10 Yes No No Yes Yes No
10 7.0 25 0.30 0.70 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
11 18.0 73 0.90 0.10 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
12 12.0 50 0.50 0.50 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
13 5.0 28 0.50 0.50 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
14 22.0 - 0.80 0.20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
15 6.0 70 0.40 0.60 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
16 4.0 68 0.80 0.20 Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know No No
17 10.0 - 0.50 0.50 Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know No Yes
18 5.0 28 0.80 0.20 Yes Yes Yes Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know
19 5.0 60 0.90 0.10 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
20 8.0 50 0.33 0.67 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
21 22.0 60 0.33 0.67 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
22 1.0 40 0.50 0.50 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
23 12.0 - 0.50 0.50 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
24 0.5 170 0.70 0.30 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
25 6.0 40 0.80 0.20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Median 7.0 55 0.58 0.42 Yes: 21 Yes: 20 Yes: 21 Yes: 19 Yes: 22 Yes: 17
Mean (n=25 for project data) 9.3 62.7 0.6 0.4 No: 2 No: 3 No: 2 No: 2 No: 2 No: 6
High 26.0 170.0 0.9 0.7 Don't Know: 2 Don't Know 2 Don't Know: 2 Don't Know: 4 Don't Know: 1 Don't Know: 2
Low 1.0 28.0 0.33 0.1
Exhibit 7. Small Pharma Executive Interview Data.
Estimated Difference in
Interview Number Years with Projects in Percentage of Programs Developed Decision Making Process Differs Number/Types of Difference in Difference in
Company Development Internally Externally A B C Decision Inputs Prioritization Metrics
1 2.0 2 1.00 0.00 No No No No No No
2 13.0 4 1.00 0.00 No No No No No No
3 2.0 3 0.00 1.00 No No No No No No
4 2.0 2 1.00 0.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 4.5 4 0.50 0.50 No No No No No No
6 6.0 16 1.00 0.00 No No No Yes No No
7 4.0 1 1.00 0.00 No No N/A No No Yes
8 3.0 1 1.00 0.00 No No N/A No No No
9 8.0 4 1.00 0.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
10 0.5 4 1.00 0.00 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
11 9.0 7 1.00 0.00 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
12 10.0 4 0.50 0.50 No No No No No No
13 3.0 3 1.00 0.00 No No No No No No
14 10.0 4 0.50 0.50 No No No No No No
15 1.5 12 0.67 0.33 Yes No No No No No
16 1.5 4 1.00 0.00 Don't Know Don't Know Don't Know Yes Yes Yes
17 1.0 8 0.71 0.29 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
18 3.0 8 0.75 0.25 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
19 2.0 15 0.50 0.50 No No No No No No
Median 3.0 4 1.0 0.0 Yes: 7 Yes: 6 Yes: 6 Yes: 7 Yes: 5 Yes: 5
Mean (n=19 for project data) 4.4 5.1 0.8 0.19 No: 11 No: 12 No: 10 No: 12 No: 14 No: 14
High 13 16 1.0 1.0 Don't Know: 1 Don't Know 1 Don't Know: 1
Low 0.5 1 0.0 0.0 N/A: 2
Chapter 6: Glossary of Selected Terms
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The document submitted in the U.S. to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (F.D.A.) for biotherapeutic products, such as
proteins and antibodies.
A request for authorization from the F.D.A. to conduct clinical trials
of (e.g., to administer) a new, unapproved drug in humans. Such
approval is legally required for interstate shipment or administration
of any drug or biologic product not approved under an NDA or
BLA.
A drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by
the F.D.A. in any other application submitted under section 505(b)
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
The document submitted in the U.S. to the F.D.A. for approval of a
new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing. In addition to
containing new chemical entities (NCEs), which are a fraction of
the total of NDAs approved in a given year, NDAs include new
salts or esters, new formulations or indications for existing drugs,
new combinations (where all active ingredients have been
previously approved), a new manufacturer for an existing drug, and
old drugs that have been marketed without an approved NDA.
Synonymous with new chemical entity.
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